Kahneman and Sugden (2005) discuss hedonism vs. Later formulations generally moved toward focus on preference fulfilment instead. Jeremy Bentham's original formulation of utilitarianism was based around happiness and suffering. Hedonic experience as the id's preferences?.numerosity, paralleling the efficiency vs. But even if so, there remain many questions, such as Which entities count as agents? How should we weigh them? And how do we assess the relative strengths of their preferences? In using preference utilitarianism to resolve moral disagreements, there's a tension between weighting various sides by power vs. While I have strong intuitions on both sides of the dispute, in the end I may side more with idealized-preference utilitarianism. I also discuss how seeming infinite preferences against suffering could lead to a negative-leaning utilitarian perspective. It's a classic debate among utilitarians: should we care about an organism's happiness and suffering (hedonic wellbeing), or should we ultimately value fulfilling what it wants, whatever that may be (preferences)? In this piece, I discuss intuitions on both sides and explore a hybrid view that gives greater weight to the hedonic subsystems of brains than to other overriding subsystems. Postscript: Dialogue on non-hedonic preferencesīased on a piece from 2006 major additions: Oct.Is creating new satisfied preferences good?.
What if neural subsystems strongly disagree with the final stated preference?.How do we compare utility within an organism over time?.How do we compare utility across organisms?.Other remaining questions for preference utilitarianism.Idealized preferences and agent-moments.Hedonic happiness, preference-based suffering.Is any sufficiently advanced intelligent agent conscious?.Hedonic experience as the id’s preferences?.Preference utilitarianism is more constrained.Infinite preferences and negative-leaning utilitarianism.
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